Inclusive Urban Development in South Africa: What Does It Mean and How Can It Be Measured? by Turok, Ivan & Visagie, Justin
Supported by: 
 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inclusive Urban Development in 
South Africa: What Does It Mean  
and How Can It Be Measured? 
Ivan Turok and Justin Visagie 
 
May 2018 
 
IDS WORKING PAPER  
Volume 2018 No 512 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inclusive Urban Development in South Africa: What Does It Mean and How Can It Be Measured? 
Ivan Turok and Justin Visagie 
IDS Working Paper 512 
© Institute of Development Studies 2018 
ISSN: 2040-0209  ISBN: 978-1-78118-447-9 
A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library. 
 
This is an Open Access paper distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 4.0  
International licence, which permits downloading and sharing provided the original authors and source are credited – 
but the work is not used for commercial purposes. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/legalcode 
 
Available from:  
Communications and Engagement Unit, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton BN1 9RE, UK  
Tel: +44 (0) 1273 915637  
Web: www.ids.ac.uk/publications  
 
IDS is a charitable company limited by guarantee and registered in England  
Charity Registration Number 306371  
Charitable Company Number 877338 
3 
 
Inclusive Urban Development in South Africa: What Does It Mean and 
How Can It Be Measured? 
Ivan Turok and Justin Visagie 
 
Summary 
Inclusive development is the seductive idea that a more dynamic and productive economy 
can go hand in hand with reduced inequality and exclusion. This requires crafting together 
different values and realities, through cooperation and negotiation between different 
economic and social interests. This is particularly difficult in South Africa (SA) because of the 
deep-seated social divisions and stagnant economy. The dominant discourses emphasise 
either ‘growth and redistribution’ or ‘radical economic transformation’. Both are driven from 
above, by national government. Neither recognise the value of mobilising the energy and 
talents of different communities and institutions within cities and regions to engage in 
democratic renewal and to support joint efforts to enhance skills, build capabilities, create 
assets, generate jobs, and improve livelihoods. Tracking progress through carefully chosen 
indicators can provide timely feedback and assist learning, to ensure that bold initiatives 
actually work and can be scaled up to achieve greater equity while expanding economic 
opportunities. Cities have considerable potential to combine prosperity with social inclusion, 
and thereby provide pathways out of poverty – but this is not automatic or inevitable, 
because a flourishing urban economy can also squeeze out the poor through the housing 
market. Proactive policies are required to manage the process of urban land and property 
development in ways that accommodate in-migrants and prevent social exclusion. A positive 
approach to investment in marginalised groups and communities is also necessary, so that 
they can develop and prosper over time, and reciprocate through higher productivity. 
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participation; migration; South Africa. 
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Preface 
This Working Paper is an output of a Rockefeller-funded project on inclusive economies, led 
by Chris Benner of the University of California Santa Cruz, along with Manuel Pastor of the 
University of California and myself. In the mid-2010s, the Rockefeller foundation had 
constructed a fivefold conceptualisation of an inclusive economy, involving equity, 
participation, growth, sustainability and stability. Chris and Manuel worked with this to 
develop an indicator framework for guiding progress towards more inclusive economies, 
starting with these five dimensions, breaking them down into 15 sub-categories, and relating 
these to 57 indicators. (See this report focusing on the national application of this 
framework). In this project, we built heavily on this work. 
 
One of the main tasks of this latest project has been to adapt and apply the framework just 
mentioned to three very different sub-national contexts: rural India, cities in Colombia, and 
metro-areas and their rural linkages in South Africa. This Working Paper represents the 
South African component of this work, undertaken by Ivan Turok and Justin Visagie of South 
Africa’s Human Science Research Council, with support from the Institute of Development 
Studies. An earlier version was presented at a lively workshop in Johannesburg, which 
brought together a range of very well informed and engaged participants, whose comments 
contributed to the quality of this document. 
 
It is hard to imagine any indicator system which would judge South Africa’s economy 
inclusive, despite two decades of constitutional democracy and comparatively ambitious 
redistribution programmes. Conventional measures indicate that the economy is flat and its 
inequality is the highest in the world. The challenge for an indicator system is not to confirm 
that South Africa does not currently have an inclusive economy, but to help understand why 
not, how better to achieve one, and to set a benchmark against which to measure progress 
in the future. Of particular concern for this Working Paper are the actual and potential roles of 
metro areas in achieving the different dimensions of an inclusive national economy.  
 
Ivan and Justin have adopted the inclusive economies framework critically but constructively. 
The system of indicators is at the core of the paper, and they use it both to explore the 
performance of South Africa’s metros, and the quality of their data. However, they have 
situated the discussion of indicators in a wide ranging and insightful account of related 
politics, policies and power. They have not only adapted the framework to South Africa, but 
also to the focus on metro areas. For example, they have added in a novel analysis of the 
shifting poverty levels of people’s migration, including into metro areas, a dimension of 
inclusion difficult to capture with conventional place-based indicator systems. This quantifies 
the impact of rural-urban migration on the reduction in economic poverty for the first time, 
and raises questions about whether there are exclusionary processes preventing migration 
from being more attractive. They have also worked to identify the sort of actions likely to 
achieve a more inclusive economy in South Africa: actions that cannot be read off a set of 
indicators, but must come to terms with them. In essence, the challenge is to enhance the 
opportunities that urban labour markets offer for economic inclusion, while countering the 
tendency of urban land markets to reinforce exclusion. 
 
Gordon McGranahan 
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Introduction 
 
The most urgent task before our nation is to ignite inclusive, job-creating economic 
growth.  
National Treasury (2017) 
 
Let this be the year of renewal, revitalisation and a steep change in progress in 
fostering inclusive growth which rolls back unemployment, poverty and inequality.  
Malusi Gigaba, Minister of Finance, 2018 Budget Speech, 21 February 2018  
 
The conventional wisdom that poor communities prosper as national economies expand and 
wealth is created has lost credibility over the last two decades. For example, post-apartheid 
South Africa (SA) has the highest recorded levels of inequality in wealth and income in the 
world (Alvaredo et al. 2017; World Bank 2018). The gap between rich and poor has 
continued to widen since the 1990s, despite economic growth averaging around 2 per cent 
per annum over this period. This is widely perceived to be unfair and unwarranted, which 
contributes to social and political instability and violent crime. The unemployment rate is 
between 26 per cent and 40 per cent (depending on how it is measured), compounded by 
stark disparities in health, education, housing and many other aspects of social and 
economic life (Stats SA 2017). The 1994 democratic government inherited serious 
grievances, deep-seated inequalities and structural distortions from apartheid, which have 
proved difficult to reverse and dismantle, including a relatively uncompetitive and resource-
hungry economy, concentrated corporate ownership, a dysfunctional public education and 
training system, and profound spatial divides within cities and between regions.   
 
The political settlement and peaceful transition to democracy promised a new social order, 
epitomised by a new constitution and new legislation. The constitution was founded on the 
values of human dignity, human rights, freedom, non-racialism, non-sexism and the rule of 
law. It refers explicitly to the need to ‘heal divisions of the past’ and ‘lay the foundations for a 
democratic and open society’. It sought to provide a framework through which poverty would 
be progressively eliminated and society transformed by safeguarding democratic 
accountability and an independent judiciary, and guaranteeing important socioeconomic 
rights and free speech. Since then, progress has been made to extend access to basic 
services, education, health care and social grants through a deliberate process of 
redistribution driven by a relatively centralised state and funded from national tax revenues. 
However, a large section of the population lacks any real stake in the economy and remains 
trapped in poverty. Upward social mobility is severely restricted and race persists as a key 
marker of hardship and exclusion (Schotte et al. 2017).  
 
The goal of ‘inclusive growth’ features frequently in the national discourse – and from right 
across the political spectrum – although often as a casual catchphrase with no real definition 
of what it means. The need for far-reaching economic and social change is widely accepted, 
yet there is no agreement about what this should involve and how it could be achieved. The 
stakes are high and rising because of the fragile state of the economy (recently downgraded 
to junk status by two ratings agencies because of the slowdown in growth, rising budget 
deficit and escalating government debt) and serious political malaise and policy paralysis. 
Poor communities in many urban townships and rural areas have grown impatient at the 
faltering social progress and the persistent skewed distribution of wealth, opportunity and 
privilege, except for the emergence of a small black elite linked mainly to an enlarged public 
bureaucracy and to black economic empowerment schemes in the private sector. People 
who can afford private education and health care increasingly opt out of state provision, 
rather than try to improve it. Popular discontent fuels violent protests, racial tensions, 
xenophobic attacks and extreme political rhetoric about nationalising the banks and mines.  
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In recent months, the idea of expropriating private land without compensation has gained 
considerable traction and caused great concern among established interests.    
 
Within the ruling party and among some leftist groups there has been burgeoning interest in 
an alternative concept of ‘radical economic transformation’. It signals a rejection of the 
cautious macroeconomic orthodoxy pursued since 1994, and a belief that the wellbeing of 
the poor majority has been sacrificed to placate financial markets and multinational 
corporations. A search for more direct ways of driving progressive change has homed in on 
using the state’s sizeable procurement budget for goods, services and big infrastructure 
projects to shift resource allocation patterns away from white-owned companies towards new 
and emerging black businesses. There is mounting evidence that the language of 
transformation has been used to justify flouting official laws and regulations, and served as a 
smokescreen for a centralising power elite pursuing patronage politics, cronyism, rent-
seeking and corrupt practices (Swilling et al. 2017). Other consequences have been to 
weaken public institutions and subvert state-owned enterprises, thereby undermining the 
delivery of cost-effective public services and eroding confidence within the private sector. 
The impact on the investment in mining, manufacturing and other industries has been very 
damaging. The transformation agenda could well backfire by crippling a system that is not 
sufficiently inclusive because it does not recognise how the economy works. 
 
An alternative, more conventional agenda gaining ground among economic insiders is that 
the priority is to halt the slide, restore faith among domestic and foreign investors, relax 
onerous regulations hampering business activity, provide greater policy certainty, and rebuild 
integrity in public institutions. This means replacing dishonest political leaders and public 
officials, re-establishing the principles of good governance and accountability, reinstating 
fiscal disciplines, raising taxes and reining in public sector spending and wages.1 There is an 
assumption that bold structural economic reforms and other fundamental changes are 
incompatible with growth and should be eschewed because they are risky to a rattled market 
economy. They threaten powerful economic interests and mobile talent, who could withdraw 
their resources and undermine the prospects of recovery. Reinstating normalcy, predictable 
rules and patience will pay-off as confidence gradually returns, investment and spending pick 
up, businesses expand, employment increases, the labour market tightens and wages rise 
over time. Rising tax revenues will pay for improved public services, enhanced redistribution 
and poverty alleviation for those without jobs. Of course, the risk with this cautious, growth-
first agenda is that too much will remain the same and its credibility will not survive. 
 
The obvious question is whether, in contrast to both of these perspectives, it is possible to 
reform or transform the economy without undermining its very existence. In other words, can 
policies to expand opportunities be combined with measures to steer the trajectory of the 
economy, so that it becomes inherently more equitable and inclusive over time? Deep fault 
lines between the key economic stakeholders and widespread social mistrust mean that 
things cannot stay unchanged, and that a growth-first agenda will not prove resilient to 
political attacks. A shared vision of a more inclusive and broad-based growth path is urgent, 
but what might this look like and whose responsibility should it be? In addition, what are the 
main dilemmas and trade-offs needing to be confronted, and what specifically should be 
done to interrupt prevailing economic patterns in order to navigate towards a fairer and more 
equal society? For example, is it necessary to contain the enrichment of affluent groups in 
order to ensure that incomes grow faster at the bottom of society? What other sacrifices and 
bargains are needed to find ways of generating value and wealth that extend the benefits 
more widely? Given the widespread loss of conviction in the democratic project, with many of 
the key national institutions now lacking popular legitimacy, it is extremely difficult to 
negotiate a new social contract built on strategic alliances across the main social partners. In 
a contested political environment, established theories and ideologies often seem to 
                                                     
1   Most of these themes feature in the new spirit of austerity that characterises the 2018 Budget. 
9 
 
complicate rather than assist pragmatic efforts to find common ground and develop 
constructive solutions.  
 
One way forward from the impasse may be to encourage a flood of initiatives to emerge at 
different levels, within communities, cities and regions, to build on the country’s rich diversity 
and support the strivings of poor citizens to get a stake in the economy. The energy and 
talents of different groups and sectors could be mobilised by bringing them together to 
engage in democratic renewal and to support joint efforts to create assets, enhance skills, 
generate jobs and improve livelihoods. Starting with readily accepted core values, such as 
equity, wellbeing and active citizenship, may be better than adhering to conventional 
formulas and dogmas. By empowering people to reach their potential and encouraging a 
collective sense of responsibility it may be possible both to hold government to account and 
to experiment with new ways of overcoming racial cleavages, strengthening social trust and 
raising living standards. Tracking progress through carefully chosen indicators should 
provide timely feedback and assist learning to ensure that radical measures actually work 
and can be scaled up to achieve greater inclusion without jeopardising the system. 
 
In this line of thinking, inclusive development means combining different kinds of enterprising 
activities with sharing resources and expertise – finding synergies between a growth agenda 
and shepherding it in a fairer direction. There are innumerable ways in which private firms 
could partner with community organisations and advocacy groups to support local initiatives, 
by melding their know-how and undertaking collaborative projects. For example, established 
property developers, urban designers and architects could form joint ventures with smaller, 
less-experienced builders in the townships to enhance their collective capabilities and open 
up new markets for homes to suit diverse household needs and spending power. Working 
together on mixed-income, inclusionary housing schemes could also play a valuable role in 
challenging exclusionary mind-sets and adapting outdated practices. 
 
This Working Paper draws on a wide-ranging framework for thinking about and measuring 
inclusive economies devised by the Rockefeller Foundation. The framework identifies 
concrete values and principles, and offers a useful provocation and entry point for analysing 
South Africa’s challenges of uneven spatial development: where do different parts of the 
country currently stand; what insights can be gleaned about the dynamics of poverty and 
exclusion; and what clues emerge about changing tack? The Working Paper begins by 
discussing the concept of inclusion, before outlining the Rockefeller framework. It then 
fleshes out the framework with original data drawn from the most reliable sources available. 
This is followed by closer analysis of key themes relevant to the spatial aspects of inclusive 
economic development. 
 
 
1  Conceptualising inclusive growth and 
development 
The narrative around inclusion has gained widespread currency over the last decade, arising 
from international recognition that many groups and communities are failing to share in the 
benefits of economic growth, technological change and globalisation. Belief in trickle-down 
economics – that a rising tide will lift all boats and that prosperity will filter throughout society 
if competitive markets, macroeconomic stability and fiscal discipline are sustained – has 
been replaced by mounting evidence of rising inequalities and social dislocation (Milanovic 
2010; Piketty 2014; Stiglitz 2015). In a more open, globalised economy with immense flows 
of goods, capital, technology, talent and information, it often appears as if governments have 
lost control over the main levers of social progress. Inequality seems to grow in the absence 
of a concerted political attempt to counter the structural dynamics that facilitate it. The phrases 
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‘inclusive growth’ and ‘inclusive development’ have become very fashionable, although they 
are often used rather loosely, without much substance or precision. For example, the UN 
General Assembly resolution on New Urban Agenda mentions the words inclusion or 
inclusive 45 times! 
 
The concept of inclusion (and its converse, social exclusion) is, of course, not new (Sen 
2000; Hills et al. 2002). The literature on human capabilities and deprivation advanced by 
Amartya Sen recognises that poverty is not simply about income (in the sense of falling 
below a basic level of subsistence). It extends to the ability to live a decent, fulfilling life, 
which includes things like access to health care, education and freedom to exercise a range 
of choices (see Sen 1983; 1999; Nussbaum and Sen 1993). Locating the concept of 
inclusion within the context of human capabilities brings into focus the relational constructs 
that underpin deprivations such as hunger, ill health or lack of basic human rights. For 
example, the problem of hunger is not just that certain people have insufficient food, but that 
there is a process of exclusion underway in terms of who has access to employment, or 
whether social food security is provided (Sen 2000).  
 
Inclusion is therefore about social processes and dynamics of change, and not simply 
distributional outcomes. It recognises the importance of human agency in that people are not 
just spectators but are essential shapers of change and their ‘bottom-up’ practices can 
contribute to socioeconomic development. It is inherently political and implies the exercise of 
power. This means asking questions about who is included and who is not, why this is the 
case, and what are the consequences? It requires deconstructing active forms of 
discrimination, such as inequality before the law, while also recognising passive forms of 
discrimination, such as unequal access to schools and health care, or even unrealistic norms 
and standards set by governments, which serve to perpetuate poverty and exclusion. Hence, 
inclusion incorporates the concept of justice or fairness, not only through rights as they 
appear on paper, but also as they operate in the real world and whether or not people have 
recourse for being excluded. The essential issue is whether people are enabled and 
empowered to improve various aspects of their circumstances, such as better housing and 
personal mobility. Do they have the range of assets required to engage actively and 
effectively with society? There may be systematic differences between groups, based on 
gender, ethnicity, age, place of residence and other variables besides socioeconomic status. 
 
Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2012) book on the institutional determinants of prosperity and 
poverty is helpful in going beyond purely economic processes to contrast the influence of 
‘inclusive’ and ‘extractive’ institutions. Whereas extractive political economies take ‘incomes 
and wealth from one subset of society to benefit a different subset’, inclusive institutions 
‘allow and encourage participation by the great mass of people in economic activities that 
make the best use of their talents and skills and that enable individuals to make the choices 
they wish’. Within their framework, it is the processes and relationships of political power that 
are central in shaping outcomes of economic inclusion or exclusion. The ability of societies to 
draw in hitherto marginalised groups, harness their energies and support their acquisition of 
vital skills and competencies to engage in productive activities can have far-reaching effects. 
Can a more all-encompassing definition of society be envisioned that builds on its 
established strengths and capabilities, while incorporating and integrating other diverse 
groups and communities into its structures and institutions to create something new and 
different from the past? This is clearly a big part of the challenge for countries in transition 
from bitter and divided histories, such as South Africa. 
 
Growth remains important to generate the resources for reinvestment and redistribution, 
particularly in societies with expanding populations and burgeoning material needs – for 
shelter, safety, comfort, health, happiness and general wellbeing. Growth is necessary to 
increase the demand for labour, to generate more jobs, to tighten the labour market and 
thereby to drive higher earnings, especially in a country like South Africa where 
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unemployment levels are extraordinary. It is also important to finance basic necessities and 
feed enlarged populations. Yet growth may be difficult to achieve in a competitive 
environment requiring ongoing increases in efficiency and ingenuity, which may imply less 
labour, lower taxes and fewer regulations. Growth per se is also not sufficient because it can 
increase inequality and injustice – for example, by pricing people out of urban housing 
markets.  
 
The distinction between ‘pro-poor growth’ and ‘inclusive growth’ is useful. The former is 
primarily focused on measuring the benefits of economic growth for the poor. In its narrowest 
form, pro-poor growth occurs when the mean incomes of the poor rise, irrespective of what 
happens to the rich (Ravallion and Chen 2003). Relative pro-poor growth is an alternative 
concept, requiring that the poor benefit by a greater degree than the rich, so growth reduces 
inequality and not just absolute poverty. Pro-poor growth may be extended beyond income to 
other dimensions of poverty such as health, education or nutrition (Grosse et al. 2008). Thus, 
relative pro-poor growth is inclusive of the poor. However, the fundamental conceptual 
distinction is that ‘inclusion’ is concerned with root causes and active processes, and not 
simply with describing outcomes. Pro-poor growth is less concerned with the dynamics of 
‘how’ the poor benefit, i.e. whether it is through participation in the labour market or through 
some form of welfare redistribution (Fourie 2014).  
 
In summary, there are four important features of inclusion as an emerging concept: (i) it is 
multidimensional and involves a holistic consideration of human deprivation and 
development beyond income alone (cross-cutting issues of race and gender are particularly 
important in many societies); (ii) it is socio-political in the sense of interrogating who is 
included or excluded and the active or passive relationships of power involved in maintaining 
this; (iii) it is process-oriented and aims to identify the underlying causes and drivers of 
poverty and prosperity; and (iv) inclusion is more durable and meaningful if it is intrinsic to 
the economic process so that people have a direct stake, rather than something that follows 
after growth has occurred.  
 
These features help to illuminate potential solutions and pathways out of poverty – such as 
enterprise, jobs and livelihoods – beyond relieving the symptoms through social welfare and 
safety nets. The solutions are not simply technical because processes of dialogue, 
negotiation and compromise may be required to address trade-offs, find common ground and 
develop agreeable responses. The focus is on people, institutions and arrangements for 
effective governance, although it could usefully be extended to incorporate matters of space, 
place and geography. For example, urban land and infrastructure, public spaces and state 
regulations exert a major influence on the creation of inclusive human settlements and 
productive local economies. Urban land is an extremely valuable resource for households 
and firms, but rising land and property values can also be a serious barrier to inclusion. As 
cities grow and prosper, the demand for land and property increases, so prices rise and 
access for new households and migrants from elsewhere diminishes. This makes the 
planning, management and all-round governance of land by city authorities critical to 
inclusive development. The spatial aspects of exclusion are particularly important in South 
Africa because of the legacy of racial separation under apartheid, and the fact that blacks 
were dispossessed of significant economic assets, especially land. Consequently, the issues 
of land restitution, redistribution, reform and expropriation are particularly sensitive and 
difficult to manage. The challenges are arguably greater in cities than in rural areas because 
of the demand and pressure for land. 
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2  The Rockefeller Inclusive Economies 
Framework explained 
The Rockefeller Foundation’s Inclusive Economies Framework offers a useful provocation 
and entry point for initiating a conversation about inclusive development in South Africa – 
where does the country currently stand, what insights can be gleaned about the dynamics of 
poverty and exclusion, and what clues are generated about improving the trajectory, 
particularly at the local level? Indicators of this kind can enable useful comparisons to be 
made between different places and across different points in time. They force analysts to be 
specific and go beyond broad generalities, which is vital for a loose concept like inclusion. 
However, they should not be treated as incontrovertible and unambiguous because it is 
always possible to identify gaps, limitations and implicit assumptions that are open to 
question. Indicators may also be misleading and convey a false sense of objective reality that 
elevates the position of technocrats and detracts from efforts to engage civil society and 
capture subjective measures. Rockefeller defines an inclusive economy as one in which:  
 
There is expanded opportunity for more broadly shared prosperity, especially for those 
facing the greatest barriers to advancing their well-being… inclusive economies have 
five broad characteristics: they are equitable, participatory, growing, sustainable and 
stable.  
(Brenner et al. 2016)  
 
The five broad dimensions of equity, participation, growth, sustainability and stability, are 
divided into 15 sub-categories with 57 associated indicators (see Figure 1 and Table 1). This 
is clearly a very expansive framework with no obvious major omissions. Although presented 
in separate categories, the dimensions are not independent, and may reinforce either vicious 
or virtuous cycles of development. As with any similar framework, each indicator is 
necessarily partial and an imperfect marker of complex, intertwined phenomenon. They often 
raise more questions than they answer, and care is needed to interpret their meaning. Direct 
comparisons between different categories of places (cities, regions or countries) can be 
misleading if the context and underlying processes are quite dissimilar. There are also 
inherent trade-offs in the choice of indicator in terms of measurability, availability, and quality 
of data sources. In addition, there is an underlying tension between simplicity (focusing on a 
few fundamental indicators to reveal the essential situation) and complexity (many indicators 
to capture a more comprehensive picture). 
 
The Rockefeller indicators fit within a variety of broader efforts to track metrics of 
socioeconomic development. Agreed practices for how and what to measure are important 
for consolidating scattered information into databanks of accessible and comparable 
information. At the city-level, other notable efforts include work by the World Council of City 
Data in the creation of an ISO-standard for sustainable cities, which includes 100 indicators 
and more than 50 cities under certification. The United Nation’s Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) arguably provide the most important platform of collective advocacy and 
action by governments, NGOs and communities towards the pursuit of global development 
goals. The SDGs provide a critical point of departure in framing metrics of development. 
Their comprehensive character is both a strength in terms of covering many dimensions of 
human progress, but also a weakness in terms of focus and prioritisation. 
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Figure 1 Rockefeller Inclusive Economies Indicator Framework 
INCLUSIVE 
ECONOMY 
Expand opportunities 
for more broadly 
shared prosperity, 
especially for those 
facing the greatest 
barriers to advancing 
their wellbeing 
EQUITABLE 
A. Upward mobility for all. 
B. Reduction of inequality 
C. Equal access to public goods and ecosystem services  
PARTICIPATORY 
D. People are able to access and participate in markets as 
workers, consumers, and business owners. 
E. Market transparency and information symmetry. 
F. Widespread technology infrastructure for the betterment 
of all. 
GROWING 
G. Increasing good job and work opportunities.   
H. Improving material wellbeing. 
I. Economic transformation for the betterment of all. 
SUSTAINABLE 
J. Social and economic wellbeing is increasingly 
sustained over time.  
K. Greater investments in environmental health and 
reduced natural resource usage. 
L. Decision-making processes incorporate long-term 
costs. 
STABLE 
M. Public and private confidence in the future and ability to 
predict outcome economic decisions.  
N. Members of society are able to invest in their future. 
O. Economic resilience to shocks and stresses. 
Source: Brenner et al. (2016)  
 
Notwithstanding the difficulties faced by any indicator framework, an important feature of the 
Rockefeller approach is that they ‘try to emphasize in our selection of indicators what might 
be considered outcome measures, rather than process indicators’ and further caution that 
‘the main purpose of this report is to measure outcomes of an inclusive economy as opposed 
to the various processes that enable building inclusive economies’ (Brenner et al. 2016: 13). 
This reflects the complexities involved in trying to measure the underlying dynamics of 
inclusion and exclusion, which are inevitably multidimensional and difficult to disentangle. 
Nevertheless, we recognise the value of probing cause–effect mechanisms and therefore 
attempt to identify at least some of the main proximate causes. This offers an extension to 
the Rockefeller indicator analysis. However, the price paid for extending the work in this way 
is to limit the scope of the indicators that are analysed more deeply, which is partly why the 
report generally uses the phrase ‘inclusive development’ rather than ‘inclusive economies’. It 
should be noted that the boundaries of inclusive development are not defined precisely, and 
it could be argued that the concept includes social protection, economic resilience and 
environmental sustainability. Nevertheless, the emphasis is different from the SDGs. 
 
A novel contribution of the analysis presented here is the original sourcing and generation of 
spatial and city-level data from Stats SA surveys. South Africa has a rich repository of readily 
accessible secondary data that enable indicators in the Rockefeller framework to be 
populated in most of the sub-categories. There are some limitations at the city-level because 
the data is simply unavailable or the degree of accuracy is diminished by the sample sizes. 
We have deliberately chosen not to use readily available commercial sources of information, 
which are based on models that forecast and extrapolate data down to local and regional 
levels, because they do not disclose their original sources, methods and assumptions. A big 
gap at the city-level is reliable data related to economic output, value added, trade and 
investment, including sectoral breakdowns. This is a serious weakness in the current 
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statistical landscape in SA, albeit one that the National Treasury and other stakeholders are 
trying to address. The Government Technical Advisory Centre has created an Economy of 
Regions Learning Network to take forward this agenda.2  
 
 
3  Spatial dynamics of inclusive development 
in South Africa 
South Africa has the highest recorded levels of income and wealth inequality in the world, 
and low levels of inter-generational social mobility (Piketty 2014; Schotte et al. 2017; 
Alvaredo et al. 2017). Despite over two decades of constitutional democracy and many 
redistributive policies, there is widespread recognition that inequalities have probably been 
rising (Ardington et al. 2005; van der Berg 2014; Bhorat et al. 2014). The outlook is 
unpromising, with a stagnant economy and a very slack labour market (Stats SA 2017). 
Indicators such as household income, assets and education continue to reflect historic race-
based patterns of exclusion. The labour market has been an acute problem because of mass 
unemployment, the relatively small informal economy and large wage premiums of highly 
skilled occupations. Unemployment among young people (aged 15–24) is a staggering 55 
per cent (Stats SA 2016a). Yet there has been progress in extending household access to 
electricity, water, sanitation, education, health care, housing and social security through 
state-funded pensions, disability allowances and child support grants. A slight reservation is 
that these expenditures do not appear to have had wider developmental spin-offs in terms of 
building human capabilities and raising living standards (Schotte et al. 2017). 
 
What does this mean for the life chances and prospects of social mobility for different groups 
of SA citizens? Have some cities and communities experienced higher levels of economic 
and social inclusion than others, and why? What are the underlying factors and forces that 
may help to facilitate or frustrate outcomes that are more inclusive? The analysis of 
inequality has traditionally been framed as a national issue, and best tackled through national 
monetary and fiscal policies that increase the demand for labour, reduce the cost of living of 
poor households and redistribute resources from well-off groups to those on low-incomes. 
 
Table 1 sets out indicators across four different geographical categories within SA. It draws 
comparisons between the largest cities (metros), other non-metro urban areas (secondary 
cities and towns), rural areas (largely traditional/tribal areas but including some commercial 
farmlands) and the national total. There are strong reasons for expecting sizeable spatial 
disparities in economic development and social outcomes in SA. The former Bantustans 
were, historically, deprived of investment in infrastructure – both physical in terms of road 
and rail, and human in terms of childhood nutrition, schooling and health care. These areas 
remain relatively unproductive in terms of agriculture and other functions, and most of them 
continue to experience net out-migration (David et al. 2018). In contrast, the metros and 
secondary cities have grown quite strongly since 1994. The Gauteng regional economy has 
performed better than the rest of the country over this period, and is the main destination for 
rural-urban migration. Originally based on the extraction of mineral resources, Gauteng’s 
economy is now skewed towards financial and business services (Turok, Scheba and 
Visagie 2017). 
 
The spatial hierarchy in Table 1 is striking. The combined force of multiple indicators of 
inclusion illustrates stark socio-spatial divisions, including employment prospects, access to 
household services, educational attainment and access to financial services. Poverty levels 
are extreme in rural areas, with four-fifths of the population below a poverty line of R1300 per 
                                                     
2  https://erln.gtac.gov.za/. 
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person per month (2015 prices). This is almost double the rate of poverty in the metros, 
although no allowance is made for cost of living differences between rural and urban areas 
(housing and transport costs are likely to be higher for many urban households). The spatial 
gap is confirmed by the fact that twice as many people report having run out of money to buy 
food in rural areas compared with in the cities. Interestingly, inequality is much lower in the 
former homelands and farming areas (as shown by the proportion of the population below  
50 per cent of the median income). This corresponds with a general lack of wealth, as 
average per capita income is less than R1,000 in rural areas, compared to more than R4,000 
in the metros – another conspicuous spatial disparity.  
 
The state has been progressive in redistributing resources towards poor households, through 
a mildly progressive taxation regime and a strongly progressive system of cash transfers and 
state spending on public goods and services (Tseng 2013; Woolard et al. 2015). Inchauste et 
al. (2015) estimate that the income received by the richest 10 per cent of households (before 
tax and state transfers) is more than 1,000 times that received by the bottom 10 per cent. 
However, if state transfers and taxation are included in the calculation, this number reduces 
to about 66 times. This is still highly unequal. State redistribution is particularly important for 
rural households because they are less independent economically and more reliant on state 
welfare. Indeed, no less than two-thirds of rural households are dependent upon social 
grants, compared with one third in the metros (Indicator O1).  
 
Tax data illustrates how fiscal allocations are strongly skewed towards rural populations 
through the services provided by provincial and municipal authorities. The eight metros 
generate 70 per cent of personal income tax (PIT) and receive 31 per cent of local 
government transfers, while the 61 rural municipalities also receive 31 per cent of transfers, 
but account for only 5 per cent of PIT (National Treasury 2017). This level of redistribution is 
partly designed to redress historic neglect and it supports the objectives of national unity and 
social justice. It can also be seen as an expression of solidarity between better-off and 
poorer communities. This pattern of spending has enabled considerable progress to be made 
to extend access to basic services since 1994, although rural areas still tend to lag behind, 
specifically in relation to piped water and sanitation facilities (see indicators C1–C3). The low 
density and dispersed character of rural settlements adds substantially to the cost of 
infrastructure delivery. The challenge is compounded by weak technical and administrative 
capacity in rural municipalities to plan and deliver infrastructure and to spend their budgets 
efficiently.  
 
While significant progress has been made in using public resources to make service 
provision more inclusive, progress in the labour market has lagged far behind. This is clearly 
where more energy and effort needs to be expended, both to provide sustainable routes of 
out poverty for more people and to generate enhanced tax revenues to pay for the services 
required by those outside the labour market (Inchauste et al. 2015; National Treasury 2017). 
In 2016, the total number of people in SA receiving social grants exceeded the number of 
people with jobs by 10 per cent, whereas the former was only one third of the latter in 2001 
(South Africa Institute of Race Relations 2017). Accelerated growth in output and 
employment are vital to raise business and household incomes, living standards and tax 
revenues. Labour market indicators show how the majority remain excluded from meaningful 
economic participation. Only 23 per cent of working age people in rural areas are in paid 
work, and only another 17 per cent are seeking work. Meanwhile, 50 per cent of working age 
people in the major cities are in paid work and another 20 per cent are seeking work. Levels 
of education are very low in the countryside, with less than a quarter of adults having 
completed secondary or tertiary education compared with half of adults in the metros (see 
also David et al. 2018). The comparative quality of investment in human capital is also 
apparent in the age-for-grade completion rates and the level of enrolment in early childhood 
development. Standardised cross-country maths and science assessments rank SA at the 
bottom of middle-income countries (Spaull 2013).
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Table 1 Rockefeller Inclusive Economies Framework: Spatial Typology 
 
    
Metros Other 
Urban 
Rural SA 
E
Q
U
IT
A
B
L
E
 
A. Upward Mobility for all A4. % enrolment in early childhood developmenti 82.1 71.0 66.3 72.8 
B. Reduction of inequality B2. % below 50 percent of median per capita household incomei 29.1 26.2 14.1 19.0 
C. Equal access to public goods and ecosystem 
services 
C1. % access to flushing toiletii 84.9 82.9 10.5 63.4 
C2. % access to piped water on premisesii 88.6 88.6 38.3 74.4 
C3a. % electricity for lightingii 92.3 91.9 85.3 90.2 
C3b. % electricity for cookingii 92.7 91.5 69.2 85.8 
C4a. % completion of primary school year-on-year (2002 cohort)iii 78.8 68.2 60.1 67.7 
C4b. % completion of secondary school year-on-year (1997 cohort)iii 48.6 34.2 21.0 33.8 
C6. % travel time 60+ min to worki 43.6 24.5 29.4 35.1 
P
A
R
T
IC
IP
A
T
O
R
Y
 
D. People are able to access and participate in 
markets as workers, consumers, and business 
owners. 
D1. Labour force participation rate (%)iv 69.0 61.6 40.3 58.3 
D2. % workforce informaliv 24.5 31.2 43.9 30.4 
D4. Household income per capita per monthi (indicative of the median) 3 130 2 547 1 042 2 264 
E. Market transparency and information symmetry. E1. World Bank ease of doing business score 
    
F1. % cell phone ownershipii 92.9 91.6 91.4 92.1 
F2. % usage of internetii 14.9 10.9 4.9 11.0 
 
(cont’d.)  
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Table 1 (cont’d.) 
 Metros Other 
Urban 
Rural SA 
G
R
O
W
IN
G
 
G. Increasing good job and work opportunity G1a. employment to population ratioiv 51.4 46.6 29.8 43.6 
G2b. unemployment rate** (expanded)iv 28.0 31.8 43.4 32.9 
G3. % below poverty linei 46.6 54.1 81.8 60.5 
H. Improving material wellbeing. H2. % ran out of money to buy food for 5+ days during the monthii 8.6 11.2 17.1 11.7 
H3. % living in informal dwellingsii 16.4 18.7 18.0 16.6 
I. Economic transformation for the betterment of all I1. % completed secondary or tertiary educationiv 49.8 38.9 22.1 38.5 
S
U
S
T
A
IN
A
B
L
E
 
J. Social and economic wellbeing is increasingly 
sustained over time. 
J2. % change in households living in informal dwellingsi&v 
    
K. Greater investments in environmental health and 
reduced natural resource usage* 
K1. Energy usage per capita per annum  
    
K2. Blue drop drinking water score 
    
K3. Green drop wastewater score 
    
K4. Volume of C02 emissions per capita 
    
S
T
A
B
L
E
 
M. Public /private confidence & predict decisions M2. % perceive their metro to be dealing with their problemsii 21.8 23.4 20.4 21.9 
N. Members of society are able to invest in their future N1. % with bank accountvi 65.0 62.8 39.5 55.8 
N2. % access to formal creditvi 17.2 13.8 4.4 11.9 
N5. % victim of crime over last yearii 8.8 8.0 5.1 7.5 
O. Economic resilience to shocks and stresses. O1. % receiving government grant cash transferi 34.1 42.4 65.4 45.5 
O3a. % share employment in manufacturingiv*** 14.7 12.2 7.4 12.5 
03b. % share employment in financial/business servicesiv 21.3 11.7 6.1 15.4 
 
Sources: iStats SA (2016d) General Household Survey 2015; iiStats SA (2016c) Community Survey 2016; iiiStats SA (2012) Census 2011; ivStats SA (2016e) Labour Market Dynamics in South Africa 
2015; vStats SA (2003a) Census 2001; viSALDRU (2016) National Income Dynamics Study 2008 – 2014/15  
Notes:  
*Indices under ‘sustainability’ could not be populated due to the spatial categorisation used 
** Unemployment was not included in the Rockefeller Framework but has been included as an extension of the employment to population ratio in light of chronic unemployment in South Africa. 
*** O3a&b are an adaptation as a substitute for indicating economic maturity through the Herfindahl-Hirschman Product Concentration Index
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Summing up, the state’s general approach can be characterised as more ‘pro-poor’ than 
‘inclusive’. Redistribution via national fiscal transfers has featured strongly in the absence of 
transformative and accelerated economic growth. In the context of an anaemic economy, 
chronic unemployment and profound social inequalities, state redistribution has done much 
to alleviate human suffering and material deprivation. It has served as a palliative to 
compensate for the lack of fundamental economic progress and broad-based prosperity. 
However, investment in public goods and household services does not appear to have 
generated a developmental dividend. In other words, it has not laid the basis for, or created 
the momentum to sustain, heightened economic progress and social mobility, at least not 
yet. According to the National Treasury, the state’s fiscal capacity has now reached its limit 
for further redistribution. New ideas about growth and development seem necessary to 
address the economic malaise. Without tackling the structural problems, it is difficult to see 
fiscal policy making headway in the face of deep economic exclusion and inequalities.  
 
The notion of ‘radical economic transformation’ referred to earlier conveys the urgency of 
change in the structures, institutions and patterns of ownership and control of the economy, 
although the policy priorities and mechanisms for driving change are far from clear or 
consistent. The new Minister of Finance, appointed in 2017, signalled his support for the 
concept, with 21 references to it in his first budget policy statement; for example: ‘To ensure 
growth benefits all, radical economic transformation is required to change the structures and 
patterns of ownership, management and control of the economy, so that they include all 
South Africans’ (National Treasury 2017: iii). 
 
Some versions require expropriating or nationalising material assets – particularly capital and 
land – in order to transfer them from whites to the black majority. The call to transform land 
ownership has featured particularly strongly in rural areas, reflecting the history of land 
dispossession and perceptions of a profound ‘land hunger’ (Parliament 2017). However, the 
track record of land redistribution to date suggests that this often results in a fall in productive 
activity rather than an increase (Aliber et al. 2016). This is partly because the need to 
transfer all the know-how and other support required to engage in successful farming has 
been neglected. Agriculture also represents only a small part of the livelihood strategies for 
most households in the former homelands (Bank and Meyer 2006; Nel and Binns 2000). A 
range of interventions are needed to strengthen small-scale farming, diversify rural 
economies, develop small towns as service centres and provide better logistics to connect 
rural and urban areas, as recognised by the National Development Plan. Inclusive and 
broad-based development requires getting to grips with the economic fundamentals.  
 
These fundamentals include the capacity of government and state entities to provide the 
infrastructure and other public goods for the economy to function. This includes reliable and 
cost-effective energy and water supplies, adequate road, rail and seaport links, and access 
to patient finance. It also includes support for skills training and in the gradual accumulation 
and transfer of know-how across the whole spectrum of occupations, from professionals, 
managers and engineers to artisans, plumbers, cooks and other workers. Interestingly, less 
than one in four households agree with the statement that their local municipality is dealing 
with their problems (indicator M2). This reflects widespread concerns across civil society and 
the private sector with the state of public services in general and the responsiveness of local 
government in particular. Mistrust in municipalities appears highest in rural areas. Lack of 
institutional capacity is compounded by growing revelations of maladministration and misuse 
of state resources. Genuine economic transformation is a complex undertaking that requires 
a capable state to negotiate and implement. 
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4  Migration and opportunities in the city 
 
Urbanization is increasingly recognized as a promising vehicle for the achievement of 
major aspects of the 2030 Agenda, especially given urban resource and service delivery 
efficiency as well as links to economic growth. 
McGranahan, Schensul and Singh (2016) 
 
Migration to cities in search of work appears to be a sensible strategy for many adults living 
in rural areas, bearing in mind the superior labour market prospects in urban areas. Gauteng 
experienced a net in-migration of 1.4 million people between 2001 and 2016 (Stats SA 
2016b). However, migrants face vulnerabilities through the loss of traditional kinship and 
subsistence systems, poor transport connectivity and barriers to work through soft and hard 
skills. People moving into informal settlements are particularly vulnerable to inadequate 
shelter, deficient basic services, exposure to environmental hazards and violent crime (Turok 
and Borel-Saladin 2016). Among the rural poor, does migration to cities offer a means of 
upward mobility and inclusion, or a dead-end of ongoing suffering and vulnerability? 
 
To get closer to understanding the relationship between migration and livelihoods, we use 
novel longitudinal/panel data – the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) – which 
interviews the same individuals every two years, starting in 2008. This allows us to directly 
identify migrants and measure the changes in living standards, rather than make inferences 
between urban and rural communities that are dissimilar in terms of their demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics. This evidence suggests that there may be a large, positive 
impact on life circumstances for individuals who migrate to cities.  
 
Figure 2 shows changes in the level of income poverty between 2008 and 2014 amongst 
three comparison groups: individuals who remained in rural areas; those who decided to 
migrate; and those who had remained in urban areas.3 At the start of the period, poverty 
levels among rural communities was above 80 per cent, compared to just over 50 per cent 
among the urban population.4 By the end of the six-year period, poverty had fallen for both 
rural and urban communities, but there remained a large gap in the level of income 
deprivation between rural and urban communities. In comparison, rural-urban migrants 
started out just as poor as rural communities, but managed to cut their poverty levels in half. 
In other words, the migrant cohort all started out as rural and mostly poor but ended up as 
urban and largely non-poor.  We estimate that 385,000 migrants managed to escape from 
poverty over the period, with two-thirds of those who were poor in wave one making a 
successful exit.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
3  Migrants are defined as adults (aged 19–56 years in wave one) who were rural in the first wave and moved to an urban 
area in any of the subsequent waves (and did not move back to a rural area). 
4  We employ an upper-bound poverty line of R1,140 per capita in December 2012 prices based upon a basic-cost-of-needs 
approach, as developed by Budlender et al. (2015). 
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Figure 2 Percentage below the income poverty line, wave 1 – wave 4 
 
Source: Authors’ own based on SALDRU (2016) National Income Dynamics Study 2008 – 2014/15.  
 
The NIDS data also suggests that escaping from poverty among migrants is more than just 
surface changes to household size, the number of dependents or attachment to better-off 
residents, which can all lower income poverty. Figure 3 shows that migrants experienced 
much more positive labour market prospects than individuals who chose to remain rural – a 
sign of genuine economic inclusion. The unemployment rate amongst migrants was as high 
as 50 per cent in wave one, but fell to below 15 per cent in wave four as migrants moved to 
the cities. Unemployment rates also declined among rural communities, but the impact was 
far less dramatic and unemployment ended up roughly 30 per cent. Nearly 80 per cent of 
rural-urban migrants who were unemployed in wave one had a job by wave four. This 
amounts to 175,000 jobs for the 225,000 migrants who wanted to work in wave one. 
 
Figure 3 Percentage unemployed, wave 1 – wave 4 
 
Source: Authors’ own based on SALDRU (2016) National Income Dynamics Study 2008 – 2014/15  
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While it is difficult to disentangle the mixture of factors and forces that determine the success 
or failure of an individual’s decision to resettle in an urban area, this evidence suggests that 
migration may play a decisive role in lifting some people out of income poverty, despite the 
other vulnerabilities that may arise. This is corroborated by other international studies (Kundu 
and Sarangi 2007; Su et al. 2015). Within the context of South Africa’s stark uneven spatial 
development, an inclusive growth strategy should take the role of urbanisation in narrowing 
inequality seriously. Growth is most readily achieved in cities and most growth continues to 
take place in cities. Moreover, rural dwellers who move to cities are in a better position to 
take advantage of that growth. A policy of inclusive urbanisation would mean doing more to 
strengthen the capacity of cities to accommodate the inflow of rural migrants, by creating 
more affordable and liveable environments. It would also involve supporting the forms of 
training and work experience that allow rural migrants to compete for the opportunities 
available.  
 
This would not only promote economic efficiency and growth (through the concentration of 
people and production), but also uphold basic human rights by supporting people’s freedom 
of movement to access economic opportunities and services within cities. National 
government remains ambivalent about urbanisation, despite policies such as the Integrated 
Urban Development Framework. Politicians, officials and urban elites are wary of the 
pressures induced by in-migration and see informality as a deterrent to attracting corporate 
investment and tourism. Municipal by-laws, land-use zoning systems and public 
infrastructure can all be used as instruments of inclusion or exclusion for outsiders. Where 
city authorities fail to provide serviced land for incoming populations, the result is 
overcrowded informal settlements and backyard shacks. An inclusive economy requires 
energetic efforts to accommodate rural migrants physically, and also to integrate and 
assimilate them into the existing social, economic and political fabric of the city. 
 
 
5  Inclusive development in the metros 
Urban spaces and the flows between these spaces can be exclusive, where economic 
activities are preserved for the few and the poor are trapped at the periphery, or 
inclusive, where people are able to access economic opportunities across the city. 
SACN (2016) 
 
Cities have the capacity to generate immense value and wealth, if planned, developed and 
managed effectively. More than half of the global population live in cities, which generate 
some 80 per cent of world GDP (World Bank 2017). The forces of urban proximity, density 
and diversity enhance productivity, spur investment and stimulate growth through 
agglomeration economies – the intense sharing, matching and learning among firms and 
workers (Glaeser 2011; Glaeser and Joshi-Ghani 2013; Storper 2013). Large, well-
connected cities foster business transactions and entrepreneurship, competitive markets, 
strong and diverse social networks, cultural integration, creativity and innovation. Yet urban 
prosperity and the consequential pressure of demand for land can also exacerbate 
inequalities by driving up property prices and the general cost of living, which impedes 
access to the city for low-income groups.  
 
South Africa’s history of race-based exclusion means that its cities lack some of the 
advantages of metropolitan areas elsewhere, including a compact form, efficient public 
transport systems, well-performing state schools and hospitals, a stock of affordable rental 
housing, and safe and attractive public spaces where people from diverse backgrounds can 
readily mix and mingle. Apartheid restricted black people from owning businesses and 
property, barred them from white-collar occupations, excluded them from higher education 
and confined them to poorly-serviced settlements on the periphery. Putting these interlinked 
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dynamics into reverse is proving to be difficult, especially in a context of economic slowdown 
with weakened state institutions and tepid private investment. Different groups tend to lead 
separate lives, with a proliferation of gated communities, security estates and fortified 
business precincts for privileged groups reinforcing the physical and psychological divisions. 
The cost of well-located land is prohibitive for low-income housing, and political commitment 
to use surplus state-owned land for housing has been lacking (Turok 2016). New ideas are 
needed about how cities can pursue a more inclusive trajectory, where people from different 
backgrounds share in the prosperity created by the concentration of activity. 
 
 
6  Poverty and income 
Table 2 applies the inclusive economies framework to South Africa’s eight metropolitan 
municipalities: Johannesburg, Cape Town, Tshwane, Ekurhuleni, eThekwini, Nelson 
Mandela Bay, Buffalo City and Mangaung. Each city’s score on an indicator is hued light 
green or red if performance is comparatively strong or weak.5 The overall impression is that 
the three largest city economies – Johannesburg, Cape Town and Tshwane – tend to have 
better scores. Cape Town’s performance is distinctive on critical indicators such as average 
incomes, poverty, reported hunger, access to services, unemployment and education.  
 
These aggregations hide important differences in who has access to the resources and 
privileges of each city. The easiest to identify is by race. Demographic profiles retain their 
poignancy and are necessary to understand how the benefits of cities are distributed. Figure 
4 shows the distinctiveness of Cape Town’s racial composition. Coloureds and Indians 
comprise nearly 60 per cent of the total population, compared with less than 20 per cent for 
the other metros (except for Durban with its large Indian population and Nelson Mandela Bay 
with its sizeable Coloured population). Table 3 shows the per capita income and poverty 
levels broken down by metro and race. The differentials are quite striking. White household 
incomes are typically three to four times higher than African incomes, and this is probably an 
underestimate of the true values.6  
 
Differences in the racial mix within cities can have a large knock-on effect for how aggregate 
measures of performance are scored. For example, indicator D4 shows that average 
incomes in Cape Town are higher than in Johannesburg, suggesting greater inclusion. 
However, it is the relatively large share of white households that raises the average. If 
income levels between metros are compared across race groups directly, then African and 
Coloured households in Cape Town seem to have lower incomes than African and Coloured 
households in any of the Gauteng metros (see Table 3). This suggests greater exclusion, or 
marginalisation. Likewise, levels of poverty are similar between Cape Town and 
Johannesburg if comparisons are broken down by race.  
 
Overall, race-based patterns of exclusion are clear across all the metros. The 1994 political 
transition has evidently not been matched by an equivalent shift in economic fortunes. A 
recent opinion piece by the Dean of Law at the University of Cape Town reiterated the 
conundrum:  
 
                                                     
5  The estimate is coloured according to variation across the metros – hued red or green if the number is above or below 
one standard deviation of the average.  
6  The General Household Survey collects information on incomes from various sources, but it is not designed to measure 
the incomes of richer households. For example, it does not collect data on income from property rentals or interest from 
savings that are common among higher-income groups. There is one question that asks about total household 
expenditure (if individual income source information is missing) but the upper income category is only R10,000 or more. 
This means that the average income figures reported here are indicative of the median rather than the mean. This is not 
necessarily a disadvantage because the mean is susceptible to the influence of outliers.  
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South Africa’s constitution is admired globally. It incorporates hard fought for political 
and civil rights, and a generous range of social and economic rights that can be 
enforced by courts. Why then do so many South Africans, mostly black, still live amid 
widespread poverty? Why do they continue to live in segregated spaces that reinforce 
apartheid geography? 
(Andrews 2017) 
  
Part of the answer is that democracy and political freedom have not translated into 
substantially higher incomes for most of the black population. There is evidence that the 
income gap between African and white households has narrowed, although these gains have 
been undermined by higher income gaps within race groups (van der Berg 2010; Orthofer 
2016). Domestic policy debates continue around how policies such as Black Economic 
Empowerment could be broadened and scaled-up. The biggest economic shift has occurred 
among Africans who have secured employment in the public sector, the racial composition of 
which has been transformed since 1994. The number of full-time equivalent jobs in the public 
service grew by approximately 200,000 (almost 20 per cent) between 2007 and 2013, since 
when it has contracted by 22,000 (National Treasury 2017). The public service wage bill is 
more than a third (35 per cent) of the budget allocation at R510 billion per year (National 
Treasury 2017). Further growth in public sector jobs is unsustainable as a strategy for 
inclusion because of the fiscal crisis (National Treasury 2018). The obvious priority is to 
create more jobs in the private sector, where the recent track record has been poor. The 
performance of small and medium enterprises has been particularly weak, with concerns 
about the exclusionary and predatory practices of large companies and the complex 
regulatory hurdles imposed by government. 
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Table 2 Rockefeller Inclusive Economies Framework: Metro Comparisons 
 
    Cape 
Town 
Jo’burg Tshwane Ekur-
huleni 
eThekwini Nelson 
Mandela 
Buffalo 
City 
Man-
gaung 
E
Q
U
IT
A
B
L
E
 
A. Upward Mobility for all A4. % enrolment in early childhood 
developmenti 
86.3 90.7 72.1 68.2 85.6 96.1 73.5 66.7 
B. Reduction of inequality B2. % below 50 percent of median per 
capita household incomei 
27.0 28.1 29.5 26.0 31.6 25.2 22.4 30.6 
C. Equal access to public goods and 
ecosystem services 
C1. % access to flushing toiletii 92.8 90.2 79.2 86.3 73.9 93.2 77.1 67.9 
C2. % access to piped water on 
premisesii 
88.0 92.1 89.6 87.9 85.4 93.4 71.1 90.1 
C3a. % electricity for lightingii 97.3 91.0 92.0 85.5 96.0 95.6 86.4 95.6 
C3b. % electricity for cookingii 98.3 92.0 92.1 86.1 95.7 95.4 85.5 95.9 
C4a. % completion of primary school 
year-on-year (2002 cohort)iii 
76.6 84.7 80.3 81.9 77.0 72.7 71.9 71.2 
C4b. % completion of secondary school 
year-on-year (1997 cohort)iii 
45.3 53.6 53.6 47.5 51.9 37.9 33.2 42.3 
C6. % travel time 60+ min to worki 11.1 13.0 13.6 6.5 9.0 1.4 2.3 7.4 
P
A
R
T
IC
IP
A
T
O
R
Y
 
D. People are able to access and 
participate in markets as workers, 
consumers, and business owners 
D1. Labour force participation rate (%)iv 68.4 76.6 69.7 72.6 57.0 65.9 66.3 63.6 
D2. % workforce informaliv 17.7 27.3 22.5 22.5 30.6 24.9 31.5 29.1 
D4. Household income per capita per 
monthi (indicative of the median) 
3 624 3 440 3 669 3 523 1 972 1 772 2 285 2 809 
E. Market transparency and 
information symmetry 
E1. World Bank ease of doing business 
scorevii 
73.1 67.5 70.5 72.5 72.4 67.9 71.4 72.0 
F1. % cell phone ownershipii 92.1 93.4 94.2 93.4 92.0 91.0 91.1 91.6 
F2. % usage of internetii 20.0 15.8 16.6 11.6 12.1 12.3 9.5 15.1 
 
(cont’d.)  
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Table 2 (cont’d.)  
Cape 
Town 
Jo’burg Tshwane Ekur-
huleni 
eThekwini Nelson 
Mandela 
Buffalo 
City 
Man-
gaung 
G
R
O
W
IN
G
 
G. Increasing good job and work 
opportunity 
G1a. employment to population ratioiv 53.3 55.5 52.2 50.6 47.3 44.2 48.7 46.6 
G2b. unemployment rate** (expanded)iv 22.6 29.0 28.7 32.6 23.8 32.8 28.2 32.2 
G3. % below poverty linei 37.3 42.6 40.6 42.3 63.7 61.8 56.4 51.4 
H. Improving material wellbeing. H2. % ran out of money to buy food for 5+ 
days during the monthii 
7.0 9.1 8.0 8.0 7.3 13.1 17.7 10.3 
H3. % living in informal dwellingsii 17.7 18.1 16.5 18.8 13.5 6.9 25.3 11.8 
I. Economic transformation for the 
betterment of all 
I1. % completed secondary or tertiary 
educationiv 
49.4 49.7 56.5 48.3 46.5 41.9 41.7 46.2 
S
U
S
T
A
IN
A
B
L
E
 
J. Social and economic wellbeing is 
increasingly sustained over time 
J2. % change in households living in 
informal dwellingsi&v 
-1.3 -3.0 -6.7 -10.5 -5.6 -15.2 -2.4 -10.1 
K. Greater investments in 
environmental health and reduced 
natural resource usage 
K1. Energy usage per capita per annumviii  38.2 32.9 25.3 36.0 56.0 24.9 26.5 19.3 
K2. Blue drop drinking water scoreix  98.1 98.9 95.8 99.0 98.8 90.0 92.6 84.5 
K3. Green drop wastewater scoreix  86.8 90.5 63.8 78.8 90.6 70.0 53.0 38.0 
K4. Volume of C02 emissions per capitaviii  5.3 5.2 5.3 5.1 6.7 4.3 3.7 2.8 
S
T
A
B
L
E
 
M. Public /private confidence & 
predict decisions 
M2. % perceive their metro to be dealing 
with their problemsii 
22.8 20.7 24.5 22.4 19.3 20.6 16.6 28.2 
N. Members of society are able to 
invest in their future 
N1. % with bank accountvi 65.6 66.5 79.7 75.3 53.8 55.0 63.6 60.6 
N2. % access to formal creditvi 16.8 15.4 28.3 18.0 12.3 15.4 20.4 16.8 
N5. % victim of crime over last yearii 10.8 10.2 9.0 7.8 6.3 7.5 8.1 6.4 
O. Economic resilience to shocks 
and stresses. 
O1. % receiving government grant cash 
transferi 
13.8 11.5 11.5 21.4 17.2 21.9 13.7 7.9 
O3a. % share employment in 
manufacturingiv*** 
21.5 26.2 22.5 19.7 17.2 18.3 9.8 16.3 
 
Sources: iStats SA (2016d) General Household Survey 2015; iiStats SA (2016c) Community Survey 2016; iiiStats SA (2012) Census 2011; ivStats SA (2016e) Labour Market Dynamics in South Africa 
2015; vStats SA (2003a) Census 2001; viChinhema et al. (2016) National Income Dynamics Study 2008 – 2014/15; viiWorld Bank (2015); viiiSustainable Energy Africa (2015); ixSouth African Water 
Research Commission (2012)    
Notes: * Unemployment was not included in the Rockefeller Framework but has been included as an extension of the employment to population ratio in light of chronic unemployment in South Africa. 
          ** O3a&b are an adaptation as a substitute for indicating economic maturity through the Herfindahl-Hirschman Product Concentration Index 
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Figure 4 Percentage between population groups by metro, 2016 
 
Source: Authors’ own, based on Stats SA (2016c) Community Survey 2016. 
 
 
Table 3 Income and poverty by metro and race, 2015 
 
Cape 
Town 
Jo’burg Tshwane Ekurhuleni eThekwini Nelson 
Mandela 
Buffalo 
City 
Mangaung 
Income per 
capita 
3624 3440 3669 3523 1972 1772 2285 2809 
African 2152 2601 2774 2514 1228 1247 2040 2078 
Coloured 2713 3326 4710 4209 3719 2062 2184 1713 
White 8639 8211 7278 7389 7808 4732 5541 7412 
Female-headed 4637 3785 3794 3327 2128 1717 2768 2435 
Male-headed 5631 4573 5234 4389 3599 3215 3477 3894 
Poverty 37.3 42.6 40.6 42.3 63.7 61.8 56.4 51.4 
African 47.9 48.3 48.6 51.9 76.1 77.5 60.3 58.8 
Coloured 41.9 46.1 37.6 40.2 18.9 45.4 59.2 78.1 
White 6.0 10.4 9.6 7.0 8.9 5.2 4.9 3.2 
Female-headed 40.4 46.6 49.3 53.2 63.6 68.3 54.2 58.2 
Male-headed 24.2 31.1 29.0 31.8 36.8 41.2 38.6 35.2 
Source: Authors’ own based on Stats SA (2016d) General Household Survey 2015.  
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7  Access to basic services and housing 
In terms of access to basic services – electricity, piped water and sanitation – white and 
Coloured communities already have near universal coverage. Therefore, the question of 
equal access is broadly about including poorer African households on the periphery and 
extending services into informal settlements. Figure 5 shows that great strides have been 
made in extending access for African households since 1994. Nelson Mandela Bay now 
provides access to basic services for more than 90 per cent of its population. Access to 
electricity is generally higher than to water and sanitation because electricity is simpler to 
install and does not require underground engineering works, which are costly and disruptive.  
 
Fulfilling the Constitutional right to adequate housing has been more challenging. The 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), which provides free dwellings to those 
with low or no incomes, has made considerable strides in constructing approximately three 
million housing units to date. The proportion of households in urban areas who reported 
living in a state-subsidised/RDP house increased from 7.6 per cent in 2002, to 28.5 per cent 
in 2016.7 However, the rate of growth in housing need still outstrips supply, and it is 
estimated the backlog has grown to over 2.3 million, notwithstanding the sizeable national 
budget allocation (Turok 2015). What is very problematic is that the urgency to deliver RDP 
housing has resulted in sterile dormitory settlements on the urban periphery, where land is 
cheap and readily available, rather than strategically located investments in relation to the 
existing infrastructure and economic opportunities. The probability of finding work is 
diminished by a spatial mismatch between where people live and where jobs are located 
(Budlender and Royston 2016). Furthermore, the state’s preoccupation with home ownership 
has resulted in the neglect of rental housing (GTAC 2016). Rental accommodation is widely 
regarded internationally as more suitable for well-located urban neighbourhoods, where 
density is important and land prices are relatively high. This type of housing is particularly 
suitable for young upwardly-mobile groups who want to access the labour market without 
making long-term commitments to specific properties and places. 
 
Fragmented cities tax the poor through higher commuting costs. Kerr (2015) found that 
whites spend approximately 60 minutes commuting to and from work per day while Africans 
take approximately 100 minutes. Poor households spend between 20 to 40 per cent of their 
earnings on transport alone. Indicator C6 suggests that lengthy commutes are particularly 
problematic in Cape Town, Johannesburg and Ekurhuleni. Low residential densities and 
sparse economic development along transport corridors in SA cities undermine the viability 
of new bus rapid transit systems being installed – very large subsidies are likely to be 
required for the foreseeable future. They also raise the costs of bulk infrastructure, which has 
to be stretched across a large urban footprint. The old apartheid city still dominates the urban 
form, as low incomes groups are confined to the outskirts, far from jobs in the business 
precincts and economic centres. Affluent households can afford to buy into well-developed 
former white suburbs, which have reliable services, quality schools, health care, libraries, 
dedicated security, public parks and other recreational amenities.
                                                     
7  Authors’ own based on Stats SA (2003b) General Household Survey 2002; Stats SA (2016d) General Household 
Survey 2015. 
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Figure 5 Percentage with access to basic services by metro amongst African households – 2001, 2011 and 2016 
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Figure 6 Average property price by metro (Real 2017 Q1 prices)        Figure 7 Cape Town property growth, 2001–2016    
  
Source: Authors own based on First National Bank (2017) FNB House Price Index 2001–2016.           Source: Authors’ own based on First National Bank (2017) FNB House Price Index 2001–2016.
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Persistent spatial segregation largely reflects the differential earnings and buying power of 
different groups in the labour market, and the way they get ‘sorted’ across neighbourhoods of 
varying quality. Certain policies and practices also favour affluent groups implicitly. Suburban 
freeways and mortgage tax relief for homeowners had this effect in the past. A contemporary 
example is the government’s failure to introduce a consistent system of development 
charges to recover the full costs of installing bulk water supplies, sewers, storm-water 
drainage and other public infrastructure to service new private housing projects. This 
amounts to an implicit subsidy to the developers and purchasers of these properties. To 
bring people with lower incomes closer to the urban core would require a stronger 
commitment to support mixed-income, higher-density developments. The government has 
been slow to develop an inclusionary housing policy that requires developers to ensure that a 
share of new housing projects is affordable to people on low incomes. 
 
Many low- and middle-income households struggle to find affordable housing near to their 
places of work and amenities. Figure 6 shows how property prices increased exponentially 
between 2001 and 2007 across all the metros. They slumped during and after the recession, 
and subsequently stabilised. Average house prices increased by about 70 per cent over the 
past 15 years, from roughly R600,000 to R1,100,00 (in real terms). Property prices in Cape 
Town have risen more strongly than elsewhere. Prices have increased in all suburbs, 
especially in the townships, albeit from a low base (Figure 7). Housing affordability is a 
growing concern, especially for poor and working class households. This reflects the 
shortage of housing stock, stagnant incomes and difficulties many households face in 
obtaining home loans because of their high levels of debt. Poor access to decent housing 
deprives many people of privacy, security and protection from the elements. It means they do 
not have an asset against which to borrow money, to operate a small business from, to 
protect them from income shocks, or to transfer wealth to the next generation, leading to 
upward mobility.  
 
Rough calculations illustrate how owning a property is beyond the reach of many households 
(Table 4). Assuming that a family of four dedicates 30 per cent of their household income to 
mortgage repayments, this will take more than 20 years to pay off interest-free (for people on 
average incomes, given the average house price). For African households in Cape Town and 
eThekwini, this will take close to 50 years. Only white households have realistic timeframes 
for buying homes based upon these assumptions. Affordability problems help to explain the 
rising proportion of households living in rental accommodation, which are often backyard 
shacks. The government has done surprisingly little to support the rental sector, despite the 
case for subsidising rental property in and around the urban cores for workers who cannot 
afford the rents that would make the construction of new rental stock commercially viable, 
and who are not poor enough to qualify for free housing (GTAC 2016).  
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Table 4 Property affordability by metro 
 
Cape Town City of 
Jo’burg 
City of 
Ekurhuleni 
City of 
Tshwane 
City of 
eThekwini 
Nelson 
Mandela Bay 
Average house 
price 
R1,456,354 R1,160,226 R988,872 R1,113,919 R970,824 R832,453 
 
Total household 
income* 
R14,496 R13,760 R14,676 R14,092 R7,888 R7,088 
African R8,608 R10,404 R11,096 R10,056 R4,912 R4,988 
Coloured R10,852 R13,304 R18,840 R16,836 R14,876 R8,248 
White R34,556 R32,844 R29,112 R29,556 R31,232 R18,928 
 
Total Years Pay-
off** 
28 23 19 22 34 33 
African 47 31 25 31 55 46 
Coloured 37 24 15 18 18 28 
White 12 10 9 10 9 12 
Source: Authors own based on First National Bank (2017) FNB House Price Index 2001 - 2016; Stats SA (2016d) General 
Household Survey 2015. 
Notes: * assuming a family of four based upon indicator D4 “per capita monthly income” 
          ** interest-free and dedicating 30 per cent of total income 
 
International experience suggests that delivering housing in a way that supports inclusion (as 
well as efficiency and sustainability) requires support for non-profit organisations that can 
build and manage subsidised rental housing. It also requires partnerships with the private 
sector to create mixed-income, mixed-use developments along transport routes and around 
central cities. Better coordination between housing, transport, land-use policies and public 
infrastructure is essential. Policy integration and partnership working is a departure from 
conventional land-use zoning, environmental regulation and planning procedures. Shifting 
from the traditional reactive mind-set towards ‘making things happen’ should spur greater 
creativity and innovation in urban design and execution among developers. A smarter 
approach to using vacant and under-utilised state-owned land could be a valuable 
component of this. Abandoned buildings and derelict precincts within many Central Business 
Districts offer scope to pursue more inclusive and interesting models of urban renewal, such 
as Braamfontein and Maboneng in Johannesburg, compared to the usual commercial 
projects.  
 
 
8  Informal settlements 
Moving into shack settlements is the only way for many outsiders to access cities. Living 
conditions are typically harsh with little protection from environmental and social hazards 
(Cirolia et al. 2016). Yet there are opportunities to earn a livelihood and perhaps a job 
through enterprise and effort. Such communities reflect both the sacrifice and resilience of 
people struggling in precarious conditions. In other words, they concentrate hope and 
aspiration, as well as poverty. Yet they are often stigmatised by elites for anti-social 
behaviour, for criminality and for harbouring foreigners. If the alternative is rural poverty, then 
shack areas have a role to play in facilitating upward mobility. There is some evidence that 
moving to an informal settlement can provide a path out of poverty, but more could certainly 
be done to smooth the transition (Turok, Budlender and Visagie 2017). If inclusive cities 
embody the United Nations commitment to ‘leave no-one behind’ (as well as the African 
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National Congress’ slogan ‘a better life for all’), then reaching out to vulnerable groups by 
supporting shack communities and aspiring migrants should be a much higher priority than it 
is at present. Responsibility should be shared with national government because of the 
financial burden on stretched metro municipalities. 
 
Shack populations in SA cities are still relatively small by international standards, and the 
situation is more manageable because the rate of growth is slower. Elsewhere in Africa, 
some 62 per cent of the urban population live in informal settlements. In Johannesburg and 
Cape Town, less than one in five of the population (18 per cent) live in informal settlements 
or in backyard shacks (indicator H3). Disaggregating into racial groups yields some striking 
patterns because almost all households in informal settlements are African (+95 per cent). In 
Cape Town, more than one in three Africans lived in shacks (see Figure 8) in 2016. This 
figure is obscured without looking at the racial patterns of segregation. Whilst the share of 
shack dwellers declined in all the metros between 2001 and 2016 – a tangible impact of the 
rollout of RDP housing – the absolute numbers continued to rise. This heightens the urgency 
to find more effective ways of upgrading informal settlements without displacing the existing 
residents.   
  
Government has an important role to play in establishing the foundations for all-round 
development in these areas. Without any reassurances about the future of informal 
settlements, communities behave as temporary migrants and remit any spare money to their 
relatives in the countryside (Posel and Marx 2013; Philip et al. 2014). Rival groups, 
gatekeepers and other undemocratic actors exerting control over the allocation of land and 
other scarce resource in the absence of formal legal safeguards and proper policing to limit 
crime and violence easily undermine community cohesion and safety. Rather than 
discriminating against them and periodically instigating evictions, there should be incremental 
programmes to work hand-in-hand with communities located in places that are suitable for 
long-term residence to provide the foundational elements required to invest in their future. 
This involves tangible items like essential services, social safety nets and connecting 
infrastructure. Building trust and providing some security of tenure are also important for 
people to start investing in their properties and consolidating their position in the city 
(Seeliger and Turok 2014). Alternative sites will need to be provided for communities that are 
in risky or unsuitable locations, and to de-densify overcrowded informal settlements.  
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Figure 8 Percentage of African households living in shack dwellings by metro;      
2001–2016* 
 
Source: Authors’ own based on Stats SA (2003a) Census 2001; Stats SA (2012) Census 2011; Stats SA (2016c) Community 
Survey 2016 
Note: * The total number refers to the total number living in shacks in all metros. 
  
 
9  Exclusion from the productive economy 
Creating inclusive cities depends, above all, on economic participation because of the wide-
ranging benefits that flow from having a job – for human dignity, wellbeing, living standards 
and social stability. Even a precarious job in the informal economy may offer hope and a step 
on the road to greater security. The main achievements of the past two decades, in terms of 
social grants and free basic services, have reduced absolute poverty and improved people’s 
living conditions. However, they have not supported them in developing the skills, capabilities 
and confidence to generate their own incomes through work or enterprise. The economic 
situation is dire in many townships and rural settlements, with particularly bleak prospects for 
young people. Many households go hungry and battle to survive on social grants, charitable 
handouts and informal borrowing from unauthorised moneylenders. There are frequent cases 
of domestic violence and xenophobic attacks reported in the media, reflecting a perception 
that foreigners are displacing locals from jobs and enterprise. How do these stylised facts 
bear out in relevant indicators for the metros, and are there any signs of improvement? 
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Figure 9 Rate of unemployment by metro (expanded definition)      Figure 10 Labour Force Participation Rate by metro, 2008 and 2015 
 
Source: Authors’ own based on Stats SA (2016e) Labour Market Dynamics in South Africa 2015.       Source: Authors’ own based on Stats SA (2016e) Labour Market Dynamics in South Africa 2015. 
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Figure 11 Labour market indicators by race in Cape Town and Johannesburg    Figure 12 Education by race in Cape Town and 
Jo’burg 
Source: Authors’ own based on Stats SA (2016e) Labour Market Dynamics in South Africa 2015.                                     Source: Authors’ own Stats SA (2016e) Labour Market Dynamics in SA 2015.
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Figure 9 shows that unemployment is lower in the metros than elsewhere, although it is still 
extremely high. There is some variation between the metros, ranging from 23 per cent in 
Cape Town to 33 per cent in Ekurhuleni and Nelson Mandela Bay. This may be partly 
explained by random fluctuations in sampling (due to the small sample size8) and differences 
in demographic profiles – Cape Town’s unemployment rate is 30 per cent amongst Africans. 
However, the trends are all the same, with unemployment rising significantly since the Great 
Recession in 2008. Labour force participation rates are generally falling, suggesting that 
many people have been discouraged from looking for work by the shortage of jobs. These 
are clear symptoms of a very slack labour market (Figure 10). Stimulating labour demand is 
clearly the priority for an inclusive growth policy. 
 
Yet the labour market is not slack across-the-board. Whites appear surprisingly resilient to 
the chronic unemployment that affects other groups. The average unemployment rate 
amongst whites across the metros is 7.2 per cent, which is not far above the average for 
OECD countries of 6.2 per cent and better than the European Union average of 8.2 per cent 
(OECD 2018). Figure 11 shows how whites face quite different labour market prospects 
compared to Africans. This offers some additional clues for labour market policy, i.e. the 
importance of a sound education. However, there are many other factors involved, which can 
be difficult to pinpoint from the permanence of racial prejudice to ‘soft’ skills passed on 
between generations by affluent parents. 
 
Education is clearly important (Figure 12). In Johannesburg and Cape Town, approximately 
half of the white working-age population have a tertiary level education and most have 
completed secondary school. Amongst Africans, around 10 per cent have a tertiary 
education and only 45 per cent have completed secondary school – reflecting a very serious 
problem of youngsters dropping out early with no qualifications. Continuing differences in the 
quality of education between former-white and black schools are partly responsible (Spaull 
2013). Following several years of highly disruptive student protests, the government recently 
agreed to provide free university education to low and middle-income groups, at considerable 
public cost (National Treasury 2018). This highly controversial decision was justified on the 
grounds of promoting upward mobility for Africans. Critics argued that this is the wrong 
priority, and that policy should focus on preparing young people more thoroughly by sorting 
out the school system and investing in early childhood development (indicator A4). Serious 
failures in the vocational training system also need urgent attention to better prepare young 
people for the world of work. The graduation rates of students attending technical and 
vocational education and training colleges are extremely low and there are serious concerns 
that many of the skills produced are not relevant to the demands of employers (GTAC 2015). 
The job prospects of a larger cohort of university graduates are far from clear without an 
invigorated economy. 
 
 
10   Support for small and informal enterprises 
Improvements in education and training take time and many people are desperate for 
livelihoods. There is enormous pressure to accelerate job creation, especially low-skilled jobs 
accessible to workers with poor qualifications. This is a formidable challenge in an open 
economy subject to stiff competitive pressures, relatively strong trade unions and labour 
regulations that employers criticise for inhibiting recruitment. In many other developing 
countries, the informal economy plays a much bigger role in absorbing low-skilled workers. 
Essentially, people create their own jobs below the radar of regulations by servicing the 
needs of poor communities and finding market niches in the formal economy. In South Africa, 
                                                     
8  The Labour Market Dynamics Survey pools four consecutive quarters of the Quarterly Labour Force Survey and results 
in a large national sample of 285,000 people. Nevertheless, small cities such as Nelson Mandela Bay or Buffalo City are 
each represented by a relatively small sample of less than 7,000 people (or less than 7 per cent of the total sample). 
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only two to three informal jobs are created for every ten jobs in the formal sector, which is 
low by international standards (indicator D2). The reasons for this are subject to debate – it 
could be because of punitive state actions, crowding out by the formal private sector, or 
limited skills and experience because of the history of prohibition of black enterprise in the 
cities. Interestingly, there has been a recent surge in foreign-owned informal enterprises run 
by migrants from other African and Asian countries. They now dominate the retail trade in the 
townships and seem better equipped than locals, because of their entrepreneurial skills and 
extensive business and social networks, which they use to raise capital and buy goods at a 
discount.  
 
Stronger support for small and informal enterprises should clearly be a key pillar of inclusive 
growth. On the one hand, self-reliance and informality provide livelihoods to people on the 
margins and may offer various options for those who are industrious and determined to get 
ahead. Cassim et al. (2016) argue that certain types of informal employment are conducive 
to inclusive development in SA because they offer economic opportunities to excluded 
groups, and potential income resilience through absorbing systemic shocks. On the other 
hand, workers in the informal sector are often vulnerable to exploitation and health and 
safety risks because of the lack of government protection through various labour market and 
workplace regulations. The start-up and growth of these enterprises could be encouraged by 
strengthening the skills and capabilities of entrepreneurs, providing loans and other small-
scale financial support, and enabling incremental upgrading of their activities to meet higher 
norms and standards over time. 
 
The government’s response to informality has always been ambivalent, inconsistent and 
essentially reactive. Many municipalities enforce stringent by-laws and licencing regulations 
indiscriminately and insensitively. Onerous procedures can induce marginal businesses to 
operate informally or close them down completely, rather than allow them to get stronger and 
more viable over time. A pro-active, developmental approach would differentiate between 
those with real potential to grow (and which justify targeted assistance) and those whose 
economic contribution will always be modest and may simply be tolerated under the guise of 
‘doing no harm’. Critical issues include allowing informal retailers to operate in spaces with 
high consumer footfall and affluent markets; providing suitable physical infrastructure and 
storage space to facilitate trade under hygienic conditions; streamlining planning laws and 
building permits to reduce the burden of compliance; and simplifying licensing procedures in 
order to reduce the costs. More consistent government practices are also important, so that 
one department does not try to shut a business down while another is assisting its growth. 
The idea of stimulating township economies is a relatively new policy thrust that requires 
serious analysis and strategic reflection on what should be done. 
 
 
11   Conclusion 
Inclusive growth and development are all-embracing ‘umbrella’ concepts, which can be 
useful in identifying common ground on which to build high-level agreement and consensus 
in situations of discord and mistrust. Their fluid meaning can be stretched to encompass 
diverse circumstances and interests. The drawback of this imprecision is that they could end 
up being defined so loosely that they become meaningless. Therefore, it is important to 
explicate these terms, at least in the sense of identifying core principles that are relevant in 
different contexts. These principles then need to be operationalised and applied in particular 
national or regional situations. This requires specific indicators by which different elements 
and criteria are measured. The unique historical and spatial circumstances of different 
territories inevitably mean that the meaning of these terms and the balance between different 
elements will vary greatly. The level and character of economic development are bound to be 
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among the underlying conditions that exert a big influence on local priorities, including the 
relative importance attached to inclusion rather than growth. 
 
South Africa is an upper middle-income country, but marked by such large social divisions, 
such a tortured history and so many complex problems that giving concrete meaning to 
inclusive development is particularly difficult. The current imperative to expand economic 
opportunities is clear, and a formidable challenge in itself. Yet a growth-first approach is 
simply not credible in the context of persistent racialised inequalities. Economic growth 
needs to be inherently more equitable, so that people have a direct stake in it and do not 
doubt the need for it. Improved economic literacy is also important so that citizens have a 
greater awareness of what lies behind the expansion of economic opportunities, and 
recognise the role of investment, enterprise and risk-taking as necessary ingredients of a 
dynamic economy. Generalised dismissal of capitalism and the market economy that does 
not look ‘under the bonnet’ to seek out specific processes of exclusion and how to ‘fix’ them, 
is not very helpful in the context of mass unemployment and a social crisis. Greater public 
understanding should help to develop a more coherent economic policy and ensure 
recognition of the limits of redistribution and transformation without development. Efforts to 
activate the capabilities and talents of marginalised groups will also help to make that growth 
and development more equitable and inclusive.  
 
This report is a preliminary attempt to identify certain principles and priorities of inclusive 
development that are particularly relevant to SA. The concept encourages a deliberate focus 
on objectives and actions where fairness and prosperity go together and are mutually 
reinforcing. It means identifying ways of promoting equity and justice that create value and 
expand productive activity, rather than detract from investment, enterprise and jobs. This 
does not mean that the process and outcomes are benign and harmonious, with no-one 
losing out and no social disruption. Making a country’s development path more inclusive 
necessitates questioning the status quo and challenging vested interests. Depending on the 
pace of change, this bound to be uncomfortable for some groups and communities, and it 
may provoke resistance from those who benefit from the exclusion of others. Furthermore, 
measures taken in the name of inclusion (or ‘transformation’) may be hijacked in the interests 
of new forms of exclusion.  
 
The principle of active citizenship (or ‘participation’) seems particularly important in the SA 
context, given the legacy of the black majority’s exclusion from the right to vote, to own 
economic assets and even to live freely in cities. Poor communities continue to suffer from 
multiple forms of exclusion. Mass unemployment and the absence of social security for 
working age adults reinforces the need to increase economic participation and for people to 
contribute to development through their labour power and through self-employment. When 
people take spontaneous initiatives to improve their wellbeing, through resettling in a 
different location or starting an enterprise, it should be applauded and supported by the state. 
In an emerging economy, productive activity is healthier and more sustainable than social 
welfare. Political participation is also vital to hold the government to account, to press for 
more responsive policies, and to counter centralising and authoritarian tendencies. 
Consultation and persuasion are necessary to negotiate social transformation without 
dissolving confidence among economic interests and provoking political instability.  
 
Recognising the economic significance of city-regions, and therefore the transformative 
power of urbanisation, is the second important message of this report, bearing in mind the 
continuing political ambivalence about rural-urban migration and expanding urban 
populations. Cities concentrate opportunities for economic inclusion because they offer more 
promising environments for investment and enterprise than other places. They are also more 
conducive settings in which to accommodate and integrate diverse social groups and 
communities. Therefore, they are important arenas in which the creation of wealth and 
prosperity are more likely to be accompanied by upward income mobility and equity.  
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The evidence presented on the impact of in-migration on lifting people out of poverty was 
very striking. The powers and resources of local authorities need to reflect this precious and 
hitherto neglected feature of cities. Two particular imperatives are to create conducive 
frameworks to foster enterprising activity and more affordable housing. The decision-making 
procedures across government silos need to reflect the holistic nature of inclusive growth as 
an overarching goal. This requires considerable improvement in the systems and practices of 
inter-governmental coordination.  
 
A third principle that resonates in the SA context is to strengthen collaboration by institutions 
across different sectors of society and the economy. It is particularly important to overcome 
the deep suspicion and mistrust between government and the private sector. Improving 
relationships and building confidence is necessary to negotiate changes in both sectors that 
will prove durable and produce meaningful results. Practical collaboration on a wide range of 
development projects could share the risks and rewards and achieve better outcomes than 
each sector going it alone. For example, developers and employers have useful roles to play 
in the provision of inclusionary housing, ideally in joint ventures with emerging builders to 
share know-how and technical expertise. The partnership principle also applies to the 
government’s relationships with civil society. There would be substantial benefits from 
greater empowerment of communities and involvement of local organisations in policy 
innovation and implementation. There are limits to what can be achieved through policies of 
redistribution and centralised decision-making. 
 
Looking in more detail at specific policy priorities for inclusive growth, four themes stand out 
as particularly important. First, there is a need for more emphasis to be placed on the 
physical foundations of inclusive cities, especially land, infrastructure and public spaces. 
Urban integration and spatial transformation require more determined efforts on the part of 
government to densify well-located areas in the core of cities and along transport corridors. 
Vacant and under-used land and buildings in public and private ownership, which are often 
held for speculative reasons, need to be prioritised for development and expropriated if 
necessary. Additional land may need to be acquired and serviced in advance of settlement to 
accommodate fast-growing populations without worsening overcrowding, congestion and 
affordability problems. Safe and liveable public spaces are often neglected in SA cities, but 
are vital for the circulation of people and for social interaction and mixing. 
 
Second, housing and human settlements policy needs serious attention because it currently 
tends to undermine both inclusion and growth objectives. The narrow focus on home 
ownership should be replaced, or at least complemented by, more vigorous efforts to support 
different forms of rental housing. This applies to backyard dwellings, informal settlements 
and the occupation of derelict buildings, which all need efforts to improve basic living 
conditions and service provision. It also applies to new build social rented housing and the 
conversion and rehabilitation of older buildings for affordable rental accommodation. 
Partnerships with social housing institutions and with private developers need to be scaled 
up substantially to increase the supply of affordable housing for low and middle-income 
workers. The mandate and resources available to municipalities to engage in housing issues 
are currently limited because this is a provincial function, so this also requires attention. 
 
Third, greater emphasis is needed to support the start-up and growth of small enterprises. 
This could help to provide routes out of poverty for people who cannot find jobs. It could also 
help to improve SA’s dismal record of new business formation and survival, and in due 
course increase dynamism within the SA economy. Large firms have a major role to play in 
enabling and increasing the capabilities of emerging suppliers and service providers to 
access their value chains. Higher-quality, larger-scale and better-coordinated business 
support programmes are also necessary, including advice, training, financial assistance, 
premises and other infrastructure for enterprises that warrant these forms of aid. Different 
spheres of government also need to simplify some of the red tape and streamline the 
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excessive regulations that currently impede business growth. Targeting the townships may 
be warranted, along with more affluent consumer markets in the central cities and suburban 
malls.  
 
Fourth, the theme of human development is of course fundamental to inclusive growth in SA, 
to unleash the talents, capabilities and potential of marginalised groups. It needs to be 
pursued with renewed vigour, commitment and imagination, including challenging the implicit 
biases and prejudices that hold people back. Concerted efforts are required to extend and 
improve the provision of education and training throughout the life course, starting with early 
childhood programmes and extending through school, tertiary education and vocational 
training provision for people seeking to expand their skills and competencies. An intensified 
focus on young people is essential to harness their potential and to avoid writing off a 
generation, with devastating consequences. Workplace-based initiatives, internships and 
other forms work experience are also important to support the accumulation and transfer of 
know-how and expertise on-the-job, to people with different aptitudes and from different 
backgrounds.  
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